

Decision 04-01-013 January 8, 2004

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding the
Implementation of the Suspension of Direct
Access Pursuant to Assembly Bill 1X and
Decision 01-09-060.

Rulemaking 02-01-011
(Filed January 9, 2002)

OPINION ADOPTING SHORT-TERM PRICE PROXY

I. Introduction

By this decision, we adopt a proxy for pricing of short-term power procured to serve Direct Access (DA) customers returning to bundled service on a temporary basis. Decision (D.) 03-05-034 required that DA customers returning on a temporary bundled service (TBS) basis must “pay for the incremental cost that will be imposed on the system due to additional short-term spot supplies procured to serve them” (pg. 19). The Commission further ordered that the remaining bundled customers should not be burdened with these added costs and that these customers should be left indifferent to whether DA customers use the utility as temporary “safe harbor.” (D.03-05-034, pp. 19 – 20.) As explained below, we adopt the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) 10-minute Ex Post Incremental (INC) price as the applicable proxy.

II. Background

D.03-06-035 granted limited rehearing on the issue of a suitable proxy for the short-term commodity cost of electricity.¹ This cost would be borne by those DA customers who require bundled service as a temporary “safe harbor.”

D.03-06-035 directed that this matter be addressed through a Rule 22 Working Group Meeting, (p.13) which was held on August 29, 2003. Participants in the workshop included Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), Southern California Edison Company (SCE), San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E), The Alliance of Retail Energy Markets/Western Power Trading Forum (AReM/WPTF), The California Manufacturers & Technology Association (CMTA) and Energy Management Services (EMS).

At the Working Group Meeting, five separate proposals were initially presented regarding the appropriate short-term proxy price, four of which were similar.² Through discussions, those parties offering similar proposals were able to agree on a single proposal based on the California Independent System Operator (ISO) real-time INC price. The INC price represents the market clearing price set by the marginal resource generating the energy purchased by the ISO to cover imbalance energy, *i.e.*, the difference between scheduled energy and energy required to support real-time load. Metered load in excess of scheduled load is charged the INC price.

¹ In addition to the electric commodity costs, safe harbor, Direct Access load is expected to also pay additional costs such as the California Independent System Operator's grid management costs, ancillary service costs, UFE, transmission and distribution losses, and franchise fees and uncollectibles.

² The four similar proposals were offered by SDG&E, SCE, AReM/WPTF and CMTA.

On September 15, 2003, parties submitted a “Status Report” summarizing these discussions and the proposals submitted. Participants did not reach full agreement on a price proxy proposal as a result of the workshop, but did agree on the advisability of participants filing an additional brief in support of their respective proposals for the Commission’s consideration. By Administrative Law Judge ruling dated September 25, 2003, parties were granted leave to file briefs regarding their positions on price proxies. Briefs were filed on October 10, 2003.

III. Position of Parties

A. Position of PG&E

PG&E was the only party to disagree with the use of the INC price as a proxy for TBS customers. PG&E instead offered a second proposal calling for the TBS price proxy to be based on the day-ahead short-term price indices published by the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). The ICE 10x Day Ahead Power Price Report publishes short-term indices that represent prices paid for actual day-ahead transactions for standard products.

PG&E proposes that ICE indices be adopted for purposes of setting a TBS short-term power price for the commodity cost of power to be determined as follows. For PG&E, for on peak hours (as defined by ICE) the day ahead North-of-Path 15 weighted average (by transaction volume) index. For off peak hours, the day ahead North-Of-Path 15 off peak weighted average index. For SCE and for SDG&E, the analogous South-Of-Path 15 indices would be used.

PG&E claims that ICE indices provide a more accurate proxy than the ISO INC price for the markets in which the utilities are likely to procure power for anticipated load, including TBS load in the utility’s day-ahead procurement process. PG&E claims there is no basis for believing that, as a general matter,

TBS load is served by the ISO INC market. PG&E notes that broker prices, such as those provided by ICE, have been acknowledged by the Commission for use by the utilities in procurement.³ All three utilities have used ICE as a vehicle to facilitate day-ahead transactions.⁴

PG&E opposes the use of the ISO INC index for purposes of TBS pricing. PG&E argues that because the ISO INC market is where utilities' *unanticipated* energy needs are met, ISO INC prices do not reflect the cost to serve TBS loads that *are anticipated* by the utility in advance. As such, PG&E argues that TBS pricing should be incorporated into the utility's day ahead procurement process. Therefore, as indicated in Figure 2 on page 7 of the Status Report, PG&E asserts that the ISO INC price has not tracked loads at certain times, but instead has gone down as loads go up. PG&E, thus, argues that this also suggests that ISO INC prices may not serve as a reasonable proxy for the price actually paid.

PG&E argues that both the ICE indices and ISO INC prices are transparent and verifiable. As the Status Report indicates, day-ahead ICE prices can be viewed free of charge on their website.⁵ Published information includes delivery location, highest price, lowest price, weighted average price, change in price from previous trading session, volume in MWh, number of trades executed, and number of companies executing trades. Therefore, PG&E argues, the ICE price is easily accessible, and there is no basis for favoring the ISO INC price over the ICE indices on accessibility grounds.

³ See, D.02-10-062, pp. 30-32.

⁴ Status Report, p. 5.

⁵ Status Report, p. 5.

B. Position of Joint Parties

The Joint Parties (*i.e.*, all workshop participants other than PG&E) support use of the CAISO real-time INC price for TBS pricing purposes. Joint Parties contend that the INC price is the only transparent, verifiable market-clearing price index available in California. Thus, after the demise of the PX, the INC price is the best indicator of short-term market clearing prices. To the extent that the ISO implements day-ahead and/or hour-ahead energy markets as part of its pending market redesign, the Joint Parties argue that the INC price can be replaced by these new price indices if and when the Commission deems appropriate.

Since the utilities propose to calculate the safe harbor tariff rate in the same way as the former Schedule PX, the Joint Parties argue, the volatility and occasional spiking of real-time INC prices, especially in summer peak periods, will not harm safe harbor customers. By contrast, the Joint Parties assert that the graph on page 3 of the Status Report shows that in almost 70% of the hours, the ICE prices were significantly higher than the average INC prices for the same period based on a comparison of SP-15 hourly average INC prices to on-peak and off-peak ICE SP-15 day ahead prices (as proposed by PG&E) for the month of August 2003. As noted in the Status Report, the monthly unweighted daily average of ICE prices was more than \$9.00 per MWH higher than unweighted hourly average of INC prices.

Joint Parties further argue that the California ISO real-time market is more well-known to DA customers than any other power spot market in California after the demise of the PX, and thus, use of a non-ISO market index

would require more education of customers than would use of an ISO-based price.⁶

Joint Parties argue that use of the INC price will ensure that other bundled customers are not adversely affected by the return of DA customers to bundled service. It will also free the utilities of the burden of forecasting and procuring supplies to meet the load requirements of returning DA customers, and will eliminate the risk to the utility and other ratepayers of incurring new stranded costs to meet that load.

Joint Parties argue that using the INC price mirrors the approach being taken by an increasing number of other states for pricing default utility service that do not have the option of relying on traditional bundled utility service on a long-term basis. Specifically, “default” or “standard offer” service for such customers is increasingly based on the ISO’s hourly market-clearing price, plus an adder to compensate for the utilities’ administrative/brokerage costs to provide the default service.

IV. Discussion

We conclude that while both of the alternative proxies proposed by parties represent short-term market prices, the CAISO INC price is the more appropriate proxy, and we hereby adopt it for TBS purposes. SDG&E, in its comments, identifies three criteria to consider in evaluating a price proxy: (1) relationship of the proxy price to the actual costs of utility service; (2) price transparency; and (3) dependability and continuity of the source of the price. We are persuaded,

⁶ The Status Report also notes at page 3 that, “The hourly Integrated Forward Market (IFM) which the ISO is developing may provide a superior proxy price for TBS than the real-time INC price. The proxy price issue should be revisited when the IFM is underway.” The Joint Parties concur with this recommendation.

and thus, by these comments, conclude that these criteria reasonably define a conceptual framework for selection of a suitable price proxy. We also conclude that the INC proxy meets these criteria better than does the ICE index. We thus decline to adopt the ICE as a proxy, as proposed by PG&E.

Since the ISO pays the INC price to generators to increase output when generation is not sufficient to meet load, this proxy represents a current marginal price that is appropriate to charge to safe harbor customers. Although the utilities will be buying imbalance energy from the ISO and paying INC prices for it, the utilities will not all necessarily be buying energy through the ICE or any other particular exchange and paying their particular index prices for it. Thus, a proxy from a market used continually by all three utilities is more appropriate than a proxy from one particular private exchange. The INC price provides a uniform price that can be applied on a statewide basis, thereby avoiding the situation where returning DA customers pay differing prices, depending upon the service territory location of their facilities.

In SDG&E's opening comments on the draft decision, while expressing support for the CAL ISO price as the adopted proxy, also proposes that the adopted proxy reflect changes in the pricing of ISO imbalance energy settlement pricing that are expected to occur early in 2004. SDG&E specifically asks that the Commission affirm, as part of its adoption of the TBS price proxy, that the successor to the INC price, once it is implemented by the FERC, shall be applied as the TBS proxy price. SDG&E believes that an express statement to this effect in today's decision will avoid unnecessary confusion since implementation of the TBS price proxy and the revised ISO pricing to be implemented by FERC may occur almost contemporaneously.

As explained in SDG&E's comments, the California ISO submitted its proposal to the FERC on May 1, 2002, for a comprehensive market design ("MD02"). FERC⁷ conditionally approved the ISO's proposed Real-Time economic dispatch methodology, which, among many other changes, would introduce the use of a single zonal Market Clearing Price (MCP) and eliminate the current dual pricing using separate INC and DEC MCPs.

On July 8, 2003, the ISO filed its tariff Amendment No. 54 in FERC Docket No. ER03-1046. Amendment No. 54 would implement tariff changes in Phase 1B of MD02, including the introduction of the single zonal MCP and the elimination of INC and DEC prices. SDG&E reports that the ISO and market participants are currently running market simulation tests of the Phase 1B changes, and final implementation of Phase 1B is expected to occur in February 2004.

SDG&E states that the Phase 1B successor price to the INC price for purposes of TBS proxy pricing should be the "Zonal Settlement Interval Ex Post Price." As defined in the October 22, 2003 FERC Order on Proposed Tariff Amendment No. 54, the "Zonal Settlement Interval Ex Post Price" is the price within a [10-minute] Settlement Interval in each Zone equal to the absolute value Energy weighted average of the Dispatch Interval Ex Post Prices in each Zone, where the weights are the system total Instructed Imbalance Energy, except Regulation Energy, for the Dispatch Interval. **This price will be used to settle Imbalance Energy from non-participating Load** (emphasis added) and Uninstructed Energy from participating resources."⁸

⁷ *California Independent System Operator Corporation*, 100 FERC 61,060 (2002).

⁸ *California Independent System Operator Corporation*, 105 FERC 61,091 (2003), p. 19.

SDG&E argues that because the Zonal Settlement Interval Ex Post Price will be used to settle Imbalance Energy from non-participating load, that makes it comparable to the current INC price, and therefore appropriate to charge to safe harbor customers. Since the utilities will be buying imbalance energy from the ISO at INC prices, utility non-participating load, including all bundled load, currently pays the INC price for imbalance energy. Upon implementation of the Phase 1B tariff changes, utility bundled load will be paying the Zonal Settlement Interval Ex Post Price for imbalance energy.

The Zonal Settlement Interval Ex Post Price also continues to relate the proxy price to the actual costs of utility service. To the extent the utility serves TBS load with imbalance energy, the new Zonal Settlement Interval Ex Post Price will be used to determine the cost of that utility service. While other short-term purchases in the bi-lateral market may be used to serve TBS load, index prices for those other short-term purchases such as the ICE index do not provide for price transparency or dependability and continuity of the source of the price. The Zonal Settlement Interval Ex Post Price, however, satisfies both of these criteria equally as well as the INC price, because both prices are from the ISO.

SDG&E identified the pending adoption of the “Zonal Settlement Interval Ex Post Price,” as defined in the FERC Order on Proposed Tariff Amendment No. 54, for the first time in its opening comments on the draft decision. In reply comments on the draft decision, no party expressed any objection to SDG&E’s proposed approach. In the absence of any opposition by any party regarding the merits of incorporating this pending tariff change, it is reasonable to approve the approach suggested by SDG&E to provide for transition from the INC to the pricing that FERC may adopt to replace it.

While the specific FERC tariff revisions cited by SDG&E were not identified in the workshop report or parties' briefs filed prior to the issuance of the ALJ's draft decision, we find SDG&E's proposal persuasive concerning the merits of acknowledging the pending revisions. To the extent that the INC is superseded by a revised pricing structure, it makes sense to make provision for incorporating the successor pricing structure in the TBS price proxy as adopted herein. There is no point in requiring an obsolete pricing formula to remain in effect once it has been superseded. Accordingly, in view of the imminent expectation of FERC's action adopting the revised pricing structure as outlined above, we shall adopt the INC with the provision for it to be superseded by the "Zonal Settlement Interval Ex Post Price," as defined in the FERC Order on Proposed Tariff Amendment No. 54.⁹

The utilities are authorized to file an appropriate TBS tariff amendment advice letter to incorporate the revision of the FERC tariff rate upon final adoption and implementation of the revised rate structure by FERC (*i.e.*, when the new "Zonal Settlement" pricing structure replaces the INC, which would no longer apply). If, for some reason, the FERC tariff changes are not adopted as anticipated in SDG&E's comments, then the participants in the workshop should apprise the Commission of the changed circumstances so that appropriate action at that point could be determined. Nothing in this order is intended to foreclose parties' rights subsequently to raise concerns regarding the use of the FERC tariff to the extent they identify new issues not addressed in SDG&E's comments, but

⁹ Nothing in this order is intended to affect any position to be taken by the Commission in the pending FERC action on the ISO tariff.

which they believe are relevant to the applicability of the FERC tariff changes as the successor to the INC.

The Status Report also addresses several undisputed “technical adjustments” regarding how to calculate the final price to be charged TBS customers.¹⁰ The three utilities agree to clarify their tariff filings to explicitly state that the ISO Grid Management Charge (GMC) for Congestion (Charge Type 522 Interzonal Scheduling GMC) should not be included in the TBS rate. The three utilities also agree to explicitly state the billing determinant for the GMC components included in the TBS rate.

The three utilities agree that the UFE modifier be based on recent historical numbers available from the ISO, and that it should be adjusted no more than semi-annually if actual UFE departs from the historical rate.

V. Comments on Draft Decision

The Draft Decision of Administrative Law Judge Thomas R. Pulsifer in this matter was mailed to the parties in accordance with Section 311(g)(1) of the Pub. Util. Code and Rule 77.7 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure. Comments were filed on December 19, 2003. We have taken the comments into account, as appropriate, in finalizing this order.

VI. Assignment of Proceeding

Carl W. Wood and Geoffrey F. Brown are the Assigned Commissioners and Thomas Pulsifer is the assigned Administrative Law Judge in this proceeding.

¹⁰ Status Report, p. 8.

Findings of Fact

1. Decision 03-05-034 required that DA customers returning on a TBS basis must “pay for the incremental cost that will be imposed on the system due to additional short-term spot supplies procured to serve them.”

2. In selecting a TBS price proxy, the following criteria reasonably define a suitable conceptual framework: 1) relationship of the proxy price to the actual costs of utility service; 2) price transparency; and 3) dependability and continuity of the source of the price.

3. The INC price better meets the criteria for a suitable TBS proxy than does the ICE index.

4. The use of the INC price will ensure that other bundled customers are not adversely affected by the return of DA customers to bundled service.

5. FERC has conditionally approved the ISO’s proposed Real-Time economic dispatch methodology, which, among many other changes, would introduce the use of a single zonal Market Clearing Price (MCP) and eliminate the current dual pricing using separate INC and DEC MCPs.

6. To the extent that the INC is superseded by a revised pricing structure pursuant to FERC tariff, it makes sense to make provision for incorporating the successor pricing structure in the TBS price proxy as adopted herein.

7. The Status Report also addresses several undisputed “technical adjustments” regarding how to calculate the final price to be charged TBS customers.

8. The three utilities agree to clarify their tariff filings to explicitly state that the ISO Grid Management Charge (GMC) for Congestion (Charge Type 522 Interzonal Scheduling GMC) should not be included in the TBS rate.

9. The three utilities also agree to explicitly state the billing determinant for the GMC components included in the TBS rate.

10. The three utilities agree that the UFE modifier should be based on recent historical numbers available from the ISO, and that it should be adjusted no more than semi-annually if actual UFE departs from the historical rate.

Conclusions of Law

1. As directed in D.03-05-034, a price proxy should be adopted for TBS customers that best meets the criteria set forth in Finding of Fact 2 above.

2. The Commission should adopt the INC price as a TBS proxy since it better meets the criteria set forth in Finding of Fact 2 above.

3. In view of the expectation of FERC's imminent action adopting a revised pricing structure used to settle Imbalance Energy from non-participating load, the INC proxy should be adopted with the provision for it to be superseded by the "Zonal Settlement Interval Ex Post Price," as defined in the FERC Order on Proposed Tariff Amendment No. 54, as prescribed in the order below.

4. Nothing in this order is intended to foreclose parties' rights subsequently to raise concerns regarding the use of the FERC tariff to the extent they identify new issues not addressed in SDG&E's comments, but which they believe are relevant to the applicability of the FERC tariff changes as the successor to the INC.

5. The undisputed "technical adjustments" identified in the Status Report are reasonable and should be adopted.

O R D E R

IT IS ORDERED that:

1. The California Independent System Operator 10-minute Ex Post Incremental price is hereby adopted as the applicable proxy for Temporary Bundled Service (TBS) provided to Direct Access customers under the “safe harbor” provisions as set forth in Decision 03-05-034.
2. The investor-owned utilities are hereby authorized to implement this pricing proxy provisions of this order effective immediately.
3. The utilities are authorized to file a TBS tariff amendment advice letter to incorporate use of the FERC tariff rate for the “Zonal Settlement Interval Ex Post Price,” as defined in the FERC Order on Proposed Tariff Amendment No. 54 upon formal adoption of the revised rate structure by FERC. If, for some reason, the FERC tariff changes are not adopted as anticipated in SDG&E’s comments, then the participants in the workshop should apprise the Commission of the changed circumstances so that appropriate action at that point could be determined.
4. The “technical adjustments” identified in the Status Report, page 8, that are not disputed by any party are hereby adopted. Pursuant to these technical adjustments, three utilities shall clarify their tariff filings to explicitly state that the ISO Grid Management Charge for Congestion (Charge Type 522 Interzonal Scheduling GMC) is not included in the TBS rate. The three utilities shall explicitly state the billing determinant for the GMC components included in the TBS rate. The UFE modifier shall be based on recent historical numbers available from the ISO, and that it should be adjusted no more than semi-annually if actual UFE departs from the historical rate.

This order is effective today.

Dated January 8, 2004, at San Francisco, California.

MICHAEL R. PEEVEY
President
CARL W. WOOD
LORETTA M. LYNCH
GEOFFREY F. BROWN
SUSAN P. KENNEDY
Commissioners